The Development and Evaluation of Judicial Review [Part 3] by Patterson, C. Perry
Washington Law Review 
Volume 13 Number 4 
11-1-1938 
The Development and Evaluation of Judicial Review [Part 3] 
C. Perry Patterson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Courts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
C. P. Patterson, State Bar Journal, The Development and Evaluation of Judicial Review [Part 3], 13 Wash. 
L. Rev. & St. B.J. 353 (1938). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol13/iss4/11 
This State Bar Journal is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
The Development and Evaluation of
Judicial Review
By C. PERRY PATTERSON
The University of Texas
This Is the concluding portion of Mr. Patterson's continued
article. The first portion, in the JOURNAL for January, 1938, covered
the background of the theory of judicial review in the Federal
Constitution. In the April issue he indicated the manner of incor-
porating the principle in the Constitution, and in the current in-
stallment he shows the wide use of judicial review and discusses
its significance.
MI. The Wide Use of Judicial Review
Judicial review is by far the most widely copied principle of
the Constitution. It continues to be a part of the imperial con-
stitution of the British Empire and the power is exercised by the
Privy Council-the Supreme Court of the British Empire. It is
also a part of the constitutions of Canada, Australia, South
Africa, the Irish Free State, New Zealand, Cape of Good Hope,
and the Transvaal. The supreme courts of Canada and of
Australia have in the last few months declared complete programs
of their Parliaments unconstitutional as violating the rights of
the Provinces in Canada and of the States in Australia.
Judicial review is used extensively in Latin America-in Mexico,
Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba and Venezuela.
In 1928, M. Andre Blondel, avocat, in the Cour d'Appel of
France wrote a very famous treatise on judicial review (Le
Controle jurisdietionnel de la constitutionalite des lois) in which
he advocates the adoption of judicial review for France. On
pages 374 et sequor, he has the following to say:
"From this comparative study of the American and
French constitutional systems, it is possible to see that
there is a governmental principle in both countries which
demands some method of passing upon the constitution-
ality of laws. That principle is that rigid constitutions
require independent tribunals to pronounce the law. In
the United States, historical precedents encouraged and
fore-shadowed the establishment of judicial control. But
in France, tradition was opposed to it and has operated
as a powerful influence to prevent its establishment. The
records of the early parliaments instead of supporting a
system of judicial review, have served as a warning
against it each time the judiciary has been reorganized.
The legislative power, which in the United States was
made subject to the Constitution and placed on a level
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with the other branches of government has, in France,
been made the center of our governmental system. It
became a privileged body; in practice it continues to be.
That is one of the principal reasons why France has
rejected the theory of judicial review. Without discussing
further the merits and demerits of the arguments against
such a system, it is possible to suggest certain conclusions
which appear to be valid not only for the United States
and France, but for all countries with similar constitu-
tional structures:
"(1) Judicial control of legislative acts is a normal at-
tribute of rigid constitutions which are designed
to remain superior to ordinary legislation.
" (2) The legislative body ought not to exercise any power
of the ultimate sovereign. The legislative power is
created in the same manner as the executive and
the judicial. It, like the others, should be subject
to law, and particularly to the higher law of the
constitution.
"(3) Law is to be simply the statement not the creation
of tribunals, civil or administrative.
"(4) The ordinary courts are best qualified to pass upon
the constitutionality of laws. They possess this
qualification because they are in a position to see
that the superior law is enforced above the inferior.
"(5) The law which the judges ought to enforce should
consist first of the written constitutional laws.
These laws are sufficient in countries whose consti-
tutions are very comprehensive, as in the United
States, but in France, under the Constitution of
1875, where the laws of legislative procedure are
brief and simple, the guardianship of the courts
should be extended not only to written but customary
constitutional principles. Of the latter, here are ex-
amples: Most of our modern liberties, formerly pro-
tected by successive Declarations of Rights ;-the
principle of the separation of powers, the prohibi-
tion against ex post facto laws, the provision for
annual budgets, etc.
"The constitutional practice of judicial review should
be introduced into France. It has functioned long and
well in the United States and has been adopted in more
and more countries. In this book it has been the aim to
prepare the ground for it and to show that it should no
longer be opposed. In fact, conditions have become more
and more favorable to it. .. ."
IV. An Appraisal of Judicial Review
Harold J. Laski in his Modern State says:
"The one assured result of historical investigation is
the lesson that uncontrolled power is invariably poisonous
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to those who possess it. They are always tempted to
impose their canon of good upon others, and they assume
that the good of the community depends upon the con-
tinuance of their power. Liberty always demands a limi-
tation of political authority."
Possibly one of the most convincing appraisals of judicial
review is found in De Tocqueville's Democracy in America:
speaking of the powers of the justices of the Supreme Court he
said:
"The peace, the prosperity, and the very existence of
the Union were placed in the hands of seven judges. With-
out their active cooperation the Constitution would be a
dead letter. The Executive appeals to them for assistance
against the encroachments of the legislative powers. The
legislature demands their protection from the designs of
the Executive. They defend the Union from disobedience
of the states, the states from the exaggerated claims of
the Union, the public interest against interests of private
citizens, and the conservative spirit of order against the
fleeting innovations of democracy."
Lord Brougham said:
"The devising means for keeping the Union's integrity
as a federacy while the rights and powers of individual
states are maintained entire is the very greatest refinement
in social policy to which any age has ever given birth."
Sir Henry Maine said:
"The powers and disabilities attached to the United
States and to the several states by the Federal Constitu-
tion and placed under the protection of deliberately con-
trived securities have determined the whole course of
American history. That history began in a condition of
society produced by war and revolution which might
have condemned the Republic to a fate not unlike that of
her disorderly sisters in South America. The provisions
of the American Constitution have acted on her like
those dikes which strike the eye of the traveler, con-
trolling the course of a mighty river beginning in moun-
tain torrents and turning it into an equable waterway."
James Bryce in his American Commonwealth says:
"It is nevertheless true that there is no part of the Amer-
ican system which reflects more credit on its authors or
has worked better in practice (than the Supreme Court).
It has had the advantage of relegating questions not only
intricate and delicate, but peculiarly liable to excite
political passions, to the cool, dry atmosphere of judicial
determination. The relations of the central federal
power to the States and the amount of authority which
Congress and the President are respectively entitled to
exercise, have been the most permanently grave questions
in American history, with which nearly every other po-
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litical problem has become entangled. If they had been
left to be settled by Congress, itself an interested party,
or by any dealings between the Congress and the State
Legislatures, the dangers of a conflict would have been
extreme, and instead of one civil war there might have
been several. But the universal respect felt for the
Constitution, a respect which grows the longer it stands,
has disposed men to defer to any decision which seems
honestly and logically to unfold the meaning of its terms.
In obeying such a decision they are obeying not the
judges but the people who enacted the Constitution.
"The Supreme Court is the living voice of the Consti-
tution-that is, of the will of the people expressed in
the fundamental laws they have enacted. It is, therefore,
as some one has said, the conscience of the people, who
have resolved to restrain themselves from hasty or unjust
action by placing their representatives under the restric-
tion of a permanent law. It is the guarantee of the
minority, who, when threatened by the impatient vehem-
ence of a majority, can appeal to this permanent law,
finding the interpreter and enforcer thereof in a Court
set high above the assaults of faction.
"To discharge these momentous functions, the Court
must be stable even as the Constitution is stable .. . It
must resist transitory impulses, and resist them the
more firmly the more vehement they are. Entrenched
behind impregnable ramparts, it must be able to defy at
once the open attacks of the other departments of govern-
ment, and the more dangerous, because impalpable,
seductions of popular sentiment."
V. The Importance of the Independence of the Supreme Court
as a Means of Maintaining Our Constitutional Democracy
The outstanding liberal on the present bench of the Court,
Associate Justice Harlan F. Stone, has the following to say on
this important matter:
"The progress of the Court to its present position as
the acknowledged arbiter between conflicting claims of
governmental power is in itself an interesting chapter
of constitutional history. That it has attained to that
position is not due alone to the fact that its great powers
were conferred upon it by a written constitution. It is
due quite as much to the position which it early assumed
and has always maintained of independence from every
external influence, and to thoroughness and fidelity in
the performance of its judicial labors.
"If time would permit, it would be interesting to refer
to the repeated decisions of the Court in the past 50
years, where, as in earlier periods, its action has shown the
complete detachment of its judges from all external in-
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fluences. Where the Court has divided, the divisions
have not been along party or political lines, but have
rested on more fundamental differences of legal and po-
litical philosophy. And so it may be said, with the
support of its entire history, that the position of the
Court as the controlling influence which holds each of
the governments in our system and each branch of the
National Government moving within its own orbit, with
general acquiescence in the fairness and justice of its
judgments, has been due more to its steadfast adherence
to the best traditions of judicial independence than
to any other cause."
Our history proves that in the cases of interference by the
President or the Congress with the independence of the Supreme
Court, the rights of American citizens have suffered an abridg-
ment and the Constitution has been misinterpreted. The Dred
Scott decision, the Prize cases, the MeCardle case and the Legal
Tender decisions are a few examples of what political interfer-
ence has done to constitutional interpretation.
Our history further shows what politics has done to consti-
tutional principles. What has happened to the Electoral College?
to separation of powers between the President and the Congress?
to checks and balances? Are not the state governments the
agents of the same party that is in power at Washington? How
can a Governor and a state legislature refuse to do what the
party in power at Washington wants done? Where is the in-
dependence of the states which is guaranteed by the Constitution?
Where does the Constitution make the President the boss of the
American people? It is the party system that does this. All
this is a fait accompli. Constitutionally speaking it does not
matter whether one favors or opposes this revolution, the fact
which must be admitted is that the party system has destroyed
the independence of practically every division of our govern-
mental system except the Federal Courts. The state courts have
not escaped party influences due to the failure to provide for
their independence in state constitutions. Since state courts
interpret the Constitution of the United States and since the
Supreme Court is inclined to follow their decisions, politics
through this channel touches the fundamental law of the United
States.
This tendency of the party system to secure control of the
people is not peculiar to American history. It is universally
true. It is true in Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and
Russia. The final word cannot as yet be said on the ultimate
results in Great Britain and France. The parties have the power
to establish any kind of economic or political order in these two
countries. The results in Germany, Italy and Russia do not
require elaboration.
It is childish not to realize that the only way to prevent the party
system from imposing an unwritten constitution upon the Ameri-
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can people superior in effect to the written constitution is to
maintain the independence of the Supreme Court. Since this
independence is not provided by the letter of the Constitution it
would be a matter of superlative statesmanship to complete the
structure whose foundation was so well laid in 1787.
Congress can constitutionally practically destroy the Federal
Court system. It can abolish all lower federal courts. It can
abolish the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The
original jurisdiction is relatively unimportant. By abolishing
future vacancies in the bench of the Supreme Court, it could
reduce the Supreme Court to one justice. This would be tanta-
mount to its abolition, though constitutionally the institution
would still exist. It can pack the bench of the Court and make
it the instrument of the President and the Congress. This would
make it a legislative agent and a part of the party system. This
is also tantamount to its abolition though technically there would
still be a Supreme Court. Of course Congress could refuse to
grant adequate financial support to the courts and thus seriously
impair their efficiency. In all of these possibilities, the command
of the Constitution that "there shall be one Supreme Court" is
not legally violated though the spirit of the Constitution is de-
stroyed. Are not our friends across the border who insist that
the spirit of the Constitution be given free reign a little in-
consistent when at the same time they propose to destroy this
spirit by taking advantage of technical deficiencies in the Con-
stitution ?
While this issue is before the people it is a most opportune
time to remedy the defects in the Constitution concerning our
federal court system. The Constitution should be amended to give
independence to the Supreme Court and stability to our demo-
cratic institutions. The membership of the court should be fixed
at nine and the compulsory age of 75 for retirement applying
to future appointees by constitutional amendment.
The Public and the Bar
"First, the public thinks that you give yourselves too many airs and
pretend to knowledge of ultimate truth which you do not possess ...
"Second, the public thinks you take a month to do a job which could
be finished, with reasonable diligence, In a day ...
"Third, the public thinks that the court and the lawyers cooperate
to make a game, or at least a test of wits, out of what should be a solemn
process to arrive at justice....
"Fourth, the public thinks you charge too much for your services. ...
"... Indeed, from the standpoint of public opinion, too much stress
cannot be laid upon the paramount necessity of policing your own risks.
"This is the day and this America the _lace for widespread publicity
on every public act and organization. I wonder whether the full story
of what the legal profession is doing to improve itself and to serve the
public has ever been adequately set forth. ...
". Why do you insist in hiding your light under a bushel?"
-Paul Bellamy, Editor of the Cleveland Plain Dealer, speaking
before the Junior Bar Conference of the American Bar Associa-
tion at Cleveland, July 24, 1938, published in full in XXIV
American Bar Association Journal 928, November, 1938.
